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1 Introduction
In his chapter on Ethiopia in volume 2, Alemayehu Geda contends that
in addition to the “vagaries of nature,” growth performance in Ethiopia
The chapter was written with ﬁnancial support from the National Science Foundation
(Grant SES 9905568), the Carnegie Corporation, and the Center for International
Development and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. I
wrote it while a Moore Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology. The
chapter has beneﬁted greatly from comments and criticisms received at seminars held at
Harvard University, Guelo Brittany, and at the annual meetings of the AERC 2004 in
Nairobi. Special thanks go to Steven Block for his criticisms and corrections. As ever, Karen250 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
“is largely determined by [the] strength and efﬁciency of institutions, [the]
efﬁcacy of public policies, and risk related to war” (Alemayehu 2007: 2). Of
these factors, Alemayehu emphasizes the last, placing special emphasis on
internal war. Internal conﬂict also emerges as a major determinant of eco-
nomic performance in the chapters in volume 2 on Chad (Azam and Djim-
toingar 2007), Sudan (Ali and Elbadawi 2007), Sierra Leone (Davies 2007),
Burundi(NkurunzizaandNgaruko2007),Mozambique(deSousaandSule-
mane 2007), Kenya (Mwega and Ndung’u 2007), and Uganda (Kasekende
and Atingi-Ego 2007), or in nearly one-third of the country studies.
InChadandSudan,provincesintheNorthhavesoughttodominatethose
in the South, and in both countries’ natural resources – speciﬁcally oil –
represent a major prize. In Sierra Leone, diamonds rather than petroleum
constitute the spoils of war, and rival political machines – each as adept at
campaigning in the ﬁeld of battle as in the electoral arena – seek to capture
powerandthuscontroloverdiamondrevenues.InBurundi,afractionofthe
ruling elite used their position in the military to slaughter their opponents,
capture the state, and employ public power to secure private privilege. In
Kenya, incumbents mobilized private militias to clear key districts of oppo-
sition voters as they reacted to the threat posed by the re-introduction of
electoral competition. The stories that underlie the cases thus differ; but in
each, political conﬂict imposed major costs upon the economy.
These cases illustrate the patterns of politics that characterize the state
failure syndrome: societies militarize, governments turn predatory, and life
and property become insecure. This chapter offers a theory of state failure,
captures its incidence, and explores its costs in post-independence Africa.
2P atterns of state breakdown
To portrayandanalyzepatternsofstatefailureinAfrica,thischaptermakes
use of two samples of African countries. The ﬁrst, which I shall call the
forty-six-nation sample, covers the period 1970–95 (see table 7.1) and
was assembled by the Africa project at Harvard University.1 The second,
the which I shall call the twenty-six-country sample, comprises the coun-
try cases of the AERC Growth Project and covers the period 1960–2000
(table 7.2).
Those who analyze state failure and civil war tend to make use of one
of three datasets: those compiled by James Fearon of Stanford University,
Ferree and Smita Singh deserve much of the credit for this work. I also wish to thank
Matthew Hindeman and Marcus Alexander for their technical assistance. The author alone
is to be blamed for its shortcomings.
1 www.people.iq.harvard.edu/ rbatesPolitical conﬂict and state failure 251
Table 7.1 Countries in the forty-six-nation sample, 1970–1995.
1. Angola
2. Benin
3. Botswana
4. Burkina Faso
5. Burundi
6. Cameroon
7. Cape Verde
8. CAR
9. Chad
10. Comoros
11. Congo, Republic
12. Cˆ ote d’Ivoire
13. Djibouti
14. DRC
15. Equatorial Guinea
16. Ethiopia
17. Gabon
18. The Gambia
19. Ghana
20. Guinea
21. Guinea-Bissau
22. Kenya
23. Lesotho
24. Liberia
25. Madagascar
26. Malawi
27. Mali
28. Mauritania
29. Mauritius
30. Mozambique
31. Namibia
32. Niger
33. Nigeria
34. Rwanda
35. S˜ ao Tom´ e&P rincipe
36. Senegal
37. Seychelles
38. Sierra Leone
39. Somalia
40. Sudan
41. Swaziland
42. Tanzania
43. Togo
44. Uganda
45. Zambia
46. Zimbabwe
Table 7.2 Countries in the twenty-six-nation sample, 1970–1995.
1. Benin
2. Botswana
3. Burkina Faso
4. Burundi
5. Cameroon
6. Chad
7. Congo, Republic
8. Ethiopia
9. Ghana
10. Guinea
11. Kenya
12. Malawi
13. Mali
14. Mauritius
15. Mozambique
16. Namibia
17. Niger
18. Nigeria
19. Senegal
20. Sierra Leone
21. South Africa
22. Sudan
23. Tanzania
24. Togo
25. Uganda
26. Zambia
the World Bank, or the researchers at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo
(PRIO).2 Focusing on the ﬁrst, Fearon classiﬁes 15.1 percent of its 1,196
observations as experiencing civil war, the World Bank 17.7 percent, and
PRIOonly10.8percent.3 InspectionrevealsthatPRIOexcludesfromitslist
conﬂictsinAngolaandChad;theviolencethatengulfedBurundibeginning
in 1972 and Rwanda in 1990–5; and the collapse of Sierra Leone (1972–96).
These omissions make it difﬁcult to justify the use of PRIO’s data in this
study.
2 Fearon (2003), Sambanis (2001), Gleditsch et al.( 2002).
3 Ih ere refer to Prio1000, a variable that takes the value 1 when the conﬂict results in an
average of at least 1,000 battle deaths per year.252 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 7.3 Observations positive for civil wars, forty-six African countries,
1970–1995.
WorldB ank data
YesN oR ow totals
Fearon data Yes 912 51 963
No 29 152 181
Column totals 941 203 1144
Note:P earson chi2(1) = 646.24, p = 0.000.
FearonincludesinhislistcivilwarsinMozambique,Senegal,Uganda,and
ZimbabwethattheWorldBankomits;inmyjudgment,Fearonmisclassiﬁes
yearsofresistancetocolonialrule(asinthecaseofMozambique)andofsheer
repression (as in the case of Zimbabwe) as periods of civil war. The World
Bank includes conﬂicts in Burundi (1973, 1991–3), Zaire (1992–5) and
Kenya(1991–3)thatFearonexcludes;andintheseinstances,Iwouldconcur
with the judgment of the Bank. Fearon’s data set includes countries with
minusculepopulations(e.g.Comoros,EquatorialGuinea)whichtheBank’s
does not. I will therefore employ the World Bank’s list in this chapter, while
stressing the degree to which the two sources concur in their classiﬁcation
of the country-year observations (see table 7.3).
Figure7.1depictstheincidenceofcivilwar,byyearandcountry.Asexem-
pliﬁedbyAngola,Chad,andEthiopia,somecountriesexperiencedperpetual
violenceoverthesampleperiod.AsexempliﬁedbyBurundi,Nigeria,Sudan,
and others, if a country experienced a war early on, it was likely to experi-
ence one later on as well. Note, too, that civil wars in Africa became more
common with time. Later sections of this chapter will seek to account for
these patterns in the data.
The modal number of years for which the countries remained at war was
0: over the period 1970–95 most African countries remained at peace. The
median (0) lay below the mean (7.19 years), reﬂecting the impact of the
persistently violent states. With the variance (10.7) half again as large as the
mean, there was a broad distribution of durations of violence – one that,
save for states that remained at peace, is nearly ﬂat (see ﬁgure 7.3)
Figure7.4isbasedonthetwenty-six-nationsampleanddepictsthedistri-
butionofwarsacrossthelandlockedandcoastalstatesandthoseabundantly
endowedwithnaturalresources(Iusethetime-varyingclassiﬁcationdevel-
oped in chapter 2). Civil wars were present in fewer than 2 percent of the
observations gathered from the coastal states; by contrast, they appear in
over 20 percent of those gathered from resource-rich nations and in nearly
40 percent of the observations taken from landlocked countries.Political conﬂict and state failure 253
3 The costs of civil war
The costs of war are both immediate and longer term. The immediate costs
are the destruction of life and property and the loss of income. The longer-
term costs result from the loss of capital and the reluctance, because of
insecurity, to invest.
3.1 Immediate costs
The most obvious way in which conﬂict impacts upon economic growth is
through the destruction of output and the means of producing it. Viewers
of the news will recall with horror the devastation visited upon Freetown,
Monrovia, and Mogadishu. Most Africans live in the rural areas rather than
in cities, however; the largest single sector in most of Africa’s economies
remains agriculture. But when ﬁghting takes place in the countryside, the
destruction of life and property can be fully as devastating as that in town.
AW orld Bank study of Mozambique found that in the war zones the agri-
culturalsectorlost40percentofitsimmobilecapital,suchasbuildings,and
80 percent of its mobile capital, such as cattle (Collier et al. 2003). A similar
study in Uganda found that in regions of active ﬁghting, two-thirds of the
households lost not only their homes and livestock but virtually all of their
possessions (Collier et al. 2003: 16).
Economic decline occurs not only because of the destruction of goods
and property. It also occurs because conﬂict raises the costs of engaging
in economic activity. Alex de Waal’s study (1991) of the wars between the
MengisturegimeandtheTPLFinEthiopiaprovidesavividillustration.The
ﬁghtingdestroyedcropsandlivestock;additionalgoodswerelostasthearmy
forciblyappropriatedfarmproductsinordertofeeditssoldiers.Moresignif-
icantthanthelossofproperty,Waalreports,wastheinabilitytoemploythe
market.FooddeﬁcitshadlongcharacterizedimportantregionsinEthiopia,
such as those along the coast; and within the grain-producing areas there
were seasonal shortfalls, particularly just prior to the time of harvest. In
peaceful times, merchants from the coast would therefore import manu-
factured goods into the food-producing areas and sell them in the towns;
using the proceeds to purchase grain, they would then return to the coastal
lowlands.Andwithinthegrain-producingzones,thosewhosecropshadyet
to ripen would enter the labor market, earn wages by harvesting the crops
of others, and use their earnings to purchase food for their families. During
the war, however, the government leveled the towns in Tigray; it destroyed
the capacity of buyers and sellers to meet and transact. By impressing pri-
vate transport, seizing shipments of goods, and restricting the movementY
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Figure 7.4 Civil war, by opportunity group
ofmerchantsandlaborers,italsoforestalledthemovementofgraintofood
deﬁcit areas.
The result, as stated by de Waal, was that
there was almost no local trade...I nM e q e l e ,t h ep r i c eo fg r a i ni nD e c e m b e r1982
was 181 Birr per quintal . . . In Shire it was 60 Birr and in North Wollo 40–90 Birr.
If...t rade had been possible, the surpluses . . . would have been taken to Meqele,
at a transport cost of about 47 Birr and 23 Birr per quintal respectively. (de Waal
1991: 152)
Those with surpluses experienced a loss of income; those with deﬁcits
starved.Hadmarketsfunctionedandexchangebeenpossible,theonewould
have been better off; the latter would have survived.
As families sought the means to purchase food, de Waal notes, they sold
offlivestock;butwithmanyfamiliesrespondinginthismanner,thepriceof
cattleplummeted.Failingtogainincomesfromlivestocksales,ruralfamilies
thenturnedtooff-farmemployment.Butwiththepriceofnecessities,such
as food, rising, people stopped spending on other things. Because of the
impact of the war on the urban centers of Tigray, the demand for labor
declined just when the supply was increasing. Wages therefore plummeted
and, with them, the capacity to purchase food. War led to famine in Tigray,
deWaalwrites.Andthefaminethatresultedcamenotsomuchfromphysical
shortages but rater from the collapse of incomes.4
3.2 Lagged effects
Civic conﬂict thus destroys physical assets and sparks sharp recessions.
Adding to its impact on growth is its impact on capital formation. The
4 Note the obvious parallels with Sen’s analysis of the impact of famine (Sen 1984).258 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 7.4 Ratio of value of debt to value of annual exports.
(Study sample of African countries)
State Number of
breakdown? Mean Std dev. observations FP > F
No 311.37 517.13 824
Yes 615.79 660.73 59 15.50 0.0001
Total 331.70 578.16 883
Source:W orld Bank, WorldD evelopment Indicators data.
evidence suggests that civil war lowers the rate of capital formation in both
the public and private sector.
It may appear incongruous to talk of government policy in the midst
of political collapse. But even in periods of maximal disorder, govern-
mentscontinuetocommandpublicbureaucracies;theyenlistthemintheir
campaigns for military victory. In such crises, governments are impatient,
however;andthisimpatienceshapesthenatureoftheirpolicies.Beinginse-
cure,governmentsdiscountlong-termeconomiccostsinfavorofshort-term
beneﬁts.Inpoorcountries,5 theWorldBankreports,militaryspendingrises
fromanaverageof2.8percentofGDPtoanaverageof5percent(Collieretal.
2003), while spending on education, infrastructure, or health care declines.
In the words of the World Bank, expenditures on the military “crowd out”
public investments.
Consider the ﬁndings reported in chapter 10 on political reform: in both
the African and the global samples, the governments of countries listed in
theproblemsetsoftheStateFailureTaskForcetendedtobemorelikelytobe
ratedasopportunisticbyinvestors.Inthejudgmentofprivatebusinessmen,
thesegovernmentsweresigniﬁcantlymorelikelytorepudiatecontractsorto
seize property. These actions, too, represent evidence of a strong preference
for short-term gains, even at the cost of future losses from a tarnished
reputation.
Turning to the twenty-six country cases studied in the AERC Growth
Project, the evidence suggests that insecure governments are more likely to
incur debt. As noted in table 7.4 in the years in which states were judged to
havecollapsed,theratioofdebttoexportsdoubled.Andasnotedintable7.5,
therewasa25percentincreaseinlevelofgovernmentconsumption–some-
thingthathadtobeﬁnancedeitherthroughtheshort-termlossofpurchas-
ing power (as a result of inﬂation) or by sacriﬁcing growth (as a result of
higher interest rates).
5 I.e. countries with a per capita income of less than $3,000.Political conﬂict and state failure 259
Table 7.5 Government consumption as a percent of GDP.
(Study sample of African countries)
State No. of
breakdown? Mean Std dev. observations FP > F
No 16.28 7.04 548
Yes 18.46 9.18 64 5.13 0.024
Total 15.51 7.32 612
Source:W orld Bank, WorldD evelopment Indicators data.
Research by Collier, Hoefﬂer, and Pattillo (2002)o ffers insight into the
impact of violence on private capital. Conﬂict affects both the composition
and the quantity of capital, they stress. In the face of possible violence,
people prefer to hold portfolios weighted toward more mobile forms of
capital; they prefer liquid to ﬁxed investments. And in an environment in
which ﬁghting destroys the fruits of productive effort, the productivity of
capital declines; when ﬁghting begins, people therefore adjust downward
the amount of capital they wish to employ. The reduction in the demand
for capital and the shift from ﬁxed to liquid capital promote capital ﬂight.
As reported by Collier, Hoefﬂer, and Pattillo (2002), the data suggest that
in 1980 40 percent of private wealth had been moved offshore (2002: 1).
“That Africa has such a high proportion of its wealth abroad despite being
capital-scarce is an indication of how much...other variables matter”
(2002: 22). Among the most important of these variables, they imply, is the
threat of conﬂict.
It was Fosu (1992)w ho ﬁrst reported systematic evidence of the decline
of growth in the presence of political instability and of the importance of
the impact of political instability on capital formation. Rather than civil
wars, Fosu focused on “elite instability,” as measured by a weighted sum
of reported, attempted, and successful coups. Using a sample of thirty-
one African countries over 1969–86, he interacted this measure with the
variables in an augmented growth equation. He found that in the presence
of instability the coefﬁcients linking capital to output declined. Countries
with levels of political instability above the sample mean, Fosu reports,
tended to grow an average of 1.14 percentage points more slowly than did
their more stable counterparts.
Like Fosu, Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1999) estimate the impact
of political instability on growth; they, too, explore both its direct effect on
growthaswellasitseffectthroughitsimpactoncapital.Ratherthanrestrict-
ing attention to coups, however, Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor instead
buildacompositemeasureofpoliticalinstability,usingdatafromthirty-nine260 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
African countries over 1975–88 and weights derived from a principal
components analysis of data on guerrilla warfare, political purges, riots,
anti-government demonstrations, politically motivated strikes, and assas-
sinations.6 A1standard deviation increase in political instability leads to a
reduction of 0.15 percentage points in the mean rate of growth, the authors
report; by inﬂuencing capital formation, violence subtracts an additional
0.25 percentage points with a one-year lag.
In 2005, Gyimah-Brempong, working with Marva Corley, returned to
the study of civil war (Gyimah-Brempong and Corley 2005). Using data for
1960–96fromforty-threeAfricancountries,Gyimah-BrempongandCorley
ﬁnd a “very large [effect] relative to the average growth rates” in SSA (2005:
296) – something in excess of 4 percentage points. They conﬁrm that the
more intense the war – i.e. the longer it lasts and the higher the death rate –
thegreateritsimpact.Andtheyonceagainunderscorethesigniﬁcanceofthe
link between violence and the growth rate that runs through the formation
of capital.
By affecting the quantity as well as the productivity of capital, political
conﬂict thus has both a short- and long-term impact on growth. Adding
to the latter is the fear that countries that have been violent may become
violent once again, the impact of conﬂict on growth can be long lasting.
By Collier and Hoefﬂer’s calculations (Collier, Hoefﬂer, and Pattillo 1999),
the longer-term effect – or the “overhang” as Collier, Hoefﬂer, and Pattillo
(1999)phraseit–amountstoareductionof2.10percentagepointsoverthe
ﬁve years following a civil war.
At the end of the Cold War, Africa contained roughly 30 percent of the
world’s nations, 10 percent of the world’s population, and 5 percent of the
world’s economic product.7 If marked by the toppling of the Berlin Wall
in 1989, the end of the Cold War found 46 percent of the world’s civil
wars taking place in Africa; if by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, a full
6 These are the “standard” Banks measures of conﬂict (Banks 1999). Gyimah-Brempong
and Traynor (1999) use Arellano and Bond’s (1991)t wo-step procedure to control for the
impact of reciprocal causation in the relationship between conﬂict and both income and
growth.
7 We can select as our denominator the number of members of the United Nations (call that
number UN) or the number of nations with a population of 1 million or more (call that
number POP). We can select as our numerator the number of countries in SSA (call that
number SSA); the total number of countries on the African continent (AF); or the number
of countries in Africa (SSA-POP) or on the continent (AF-POP) with a population of 1
million or more. Africa’s percentage of the world’s nations (WT for world total; WT-POP
for the total number of nations in the world with 1 million or more people) can then be
calculated alternatively as: SSA/UN = 25 percent; AF/UN = 28 percent; SSA/WT = 22
percent; AF/WT = 27 percent; (SSA-POP)/(WT-POP) = 23 percent; (AF-POP)/
(WT-POP) = 29 percent.Political conﬂict and state failure 261
53percent.8 Inrecentyears,then,Africahasover-suppliedpoliticalconﬂict.
It is perhaps for this reason that political risk services rate Africa as the
riskiest continent for investors (Collier, Hoefﬂer, and Patillo 1999).
4 State failure
Two major literatures address the sources of political disorder in contem-
poraryAfrica.Oneispoliticalandpointstothelowqualityof“governance”
(WorldBank1991;Fukuyama2004)andtheothertotheweaknessofpoliti-
calinstitutions(JacksonandRosberg1982;BrattonandvandeWalle1997).
Both,itisclaimed,resultinpersonalisticformsofrulebasedonclientelism,
corruption, and repression. As stated by Christopher Clapham, the emer-
genceofinsurgencymovementsinWestAfricainthe1990s“canbeascribed
to the experience of post-independence government so bad as to lead . . . to
resistance...andtotheconsequencesof...immiseration,exploitation,and
state decay” (quoted in Adibe 2001: 28). Such accounts remain unpersua-
sive, however. How can one recognize which institutions are weak, which
statesfragile,orwhichgovernments“bad”otherthanbytheriseofpolitical
disorder? Insofar as these “causal” factors are characterized by their con-
sequences, then they add little by way of explanation. They may highlight
what has been observed, but they do little to explain it.
AsecondapproachiseconomicandisbestexempliﬁedbytheWorldBank
study,BreakingtheConﬂictTrap(Collieretal.2003).Asstatedbyitsauthors,
“the key root cause of conﬂict is the failure of economic development”
(Collier et al. 2003: 53). Stated more fully, the approach contends that
countries with low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita incomes that
have remained dependent on primary commodities for exports face dangerously
high risks of prolonged conﬂict. In the absence of economic development, neither
good political institutions, nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high military
spending provide signiﬁcant defenses against large scale violence. (Collier et al.
2003: 53)
The primary weakness of the political approach is that it borders on tau-
tology. That of the economic approach is that it fails to point to the mecha-
nisms that link economic conditions to political outcomes. While pointing
to as et of relationships between macroeconomic aggregates and political
behaviors, it fails to specify the micro-level mechanisms that generate those
relationships or the incentives that animate them.
A fresh look is thus in order.
8 The ﬁgures are calculated from data gathered by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo on
conﬂicts between insurgent groups and governments that generate 1,000 or more battle
deaths per annum (Strand, Wilhelmsen, and Gleditsch 2002).262 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
5F raming the problem
Inchoosingavantagepointfromwhichtocutintothisproblem,thechapter
takescounselfromboththe“theory”ofthestateandtherealitiesthatprevail
in contemporary Africa.
5.1 Theory of the state
AccordingtoMaxWeber,thestateis“ahumancommunitythatsuccessfully
claimsthemonopolyofthelegitimateuseofphysicalforcewithinagiventer-
ritory”(Weber1921:1).Twofeaturesofthisdeﬁnitioncommandattention:
the importance of coercion and the state’s claim to a monopoly of it.
In political science, many who study the politics of advanced industrial
nationsﬁndWeber’semphasisonphysicalforcelargelyirrelevanttothestudy
of politics. Rather than emphasizing coercion, they instead concentrate on
civic participation; and rather than putting the military at the center of the
state,theyinsteadfocusonthecivilianbranchesofgovernment.Inthecon-
text of contemporary Africa, however, Weber’s characterization rings true.
Consider,forexample,theprominenceofthemilitaryinAfricanpolitics.
Asdocumentedinchapter10onpoliticalreform,thearmedforcesprovided
the head of state in over a third of the 1,196 country-year observations
gathered from a sample of forty-six African countries over a twenty-six-
year period (1970–95). In recent years civilians have increasingly replaced
military ofﬁcers as chief executives; but one need only reﬂect upon the
EasternportionofcontemporaryAfricatoappreciatethecentralroleofthe
military.ThepresidentsofEritrea,Ethiopia,Uganda,Rwanda–membersof
theso-called“newgeneration”ofAfricanleaders–seizedpowerbyﬁghting
forit.Consider,too,thepresidentsofBurundi,Mozambique,andNamibia.
At the head of each country stood the leader of the movement that had
prevailed in armed struggle.9
Given the ease with which Weber’s characterization of the state maps on
to the realities of Africa, when we focus on the state in this analysis, we
shall focus on coercion. And we shall refer to those who head the state as
“specialists in violence.”
Weber emphasizes not only the importance of force; he also suggests that
ap olitical community becomes a state when it can successfully command
9 While some might dismiss this pattern as distinctive of Africa, idiosyncratic and therefore
of no general signiﬁcance, a glance at the history that informed Weber’s vision should
provoke reappraisal. In Medieval Europe, the Angevins and Lancasters placed generations
of warriors on the throne of England and the Merovingians and Capetians on the throne
of France. As Tilly famously states, throughout the Medieval and Early Modern period,
“war made the state and the state made war” (Tilly 1975: 42).Political conﬂict and state failure 263
a monopoly over its use. He thus points to an observable symptom of state
failure: the inability of governments to secure a monopoly of violence. Tak-
ing guidance from the theory of the state and the realities of contemporary
Africa, this chapter will therefore explore the conditions under which gov-
ernments–orspecialistsinviolence–succeedorfailtoacquireamonopoly
over the use of force. And it will take as evidence of state failure the milita-
rization of civic society.
5.2 The logic of political order
Three questions thus form the agenda for this analysis. One is: under what
conditionswillcitizenschoosetodisarm,leavingthegovernmenttoprotect
theirlifeandproperty?Closelyrelatedisasecond:underwhatconditionswill
specialists in violence choose to employ force to defend their citizens rather
thantopreyuponthem?Andbecauseneitherpoliticalordernorthe“Webe-
rian state” are givens, there arises a third: when will these choices prevail as
an equilibrium? Addressing these questions offers a deeper understanding
of the nature of political order and of the conditions under which it fails.
In search of answers, I turn from the theory of the state to the theory
of games.10 The players are two citizens and a specialist in violence. The
equilibriaofthisgamesuggesttheconditionsunderwhichordercanprevail;
bythesametoken,theysuggesttheconditionsunderwhichpoliticaldisorder
will arise. The remainder of the section presents the logic of the argument;
by applying the model to African data, section 6 assesses its validity.
5.3 The model
Consider the behavior of three players: G,as pecialist in violence, and two
citizens,i  { 1,2}.AlthoughGisaspecialistinviolence,sheisnotendowed
with a monopoly over it; the citizens, too, have access to arms and G can
achieve a monopoly of physical force only when the citizens set theirs aside.
By assumption, each citizen possesses a given amount of resources,
denotedbyTi (asintime),thatshecanallocatebetweenwork(wi),military
preparedness (mi), and leisure (li). That is,
Citizeni  { 1,2} chooses wi,mi,li   0s u b ject to wi + mi + li   Ti.
The resources devoted to work, wi,a r ep r o d u c tive; they result in an output
of F(wi) for player i.11 Those devoted to military activity are unproductive.
Ratherthancreatingwealth,theymerelyredistributeit–orprovideadefense
against its redistribution.
10 More accurately, Avner Greif, Smita Singh, and I (Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002).
11 The function F is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and concave.264 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Aftera llocating their resources, each citizen observes the decision of the
other; they then (sequentially) decide whether or not to attempt to raid the
other’s possessions, with player 1 choosing ﬁrst. The amount that one can
gain from raiding depends not only on the quantity of the other’s assets but
also on the relative strength of the players.12
As is conventional, the citizens derive their utility from income and from
leisure. They can increase their incomes by working or by employing their
military capabilities to raid.
G,t oo, seeks to maximize her utility, which, like that of the citizens,
derivesfromincomeandleisure.Asaspecialistinviolence,however,Gdoes
not need earn her income from laboring in a farm or factory; rather, she
gains it through the use of force. She can increase her income by engaging
in predation or by collecting fees for the provision of a valued service: the
provision of security for those who seek to relax or to create wealth.
Three assumptions characterize the military balance between G and pri-
vate citizens. Given that private agents are themselves capable of violence,
(i) when G preys upon the economic output of a citizen i, G succeeds in
capturing her wealth only with some probability. (ii) G engages inp r e da-
tory activity only if the expected revenue from its use of violence exceeds
its cost of military activity. (iii) And G can dispossess only one agent per
period.
Should G engage in predation, then the revenue she seizes from i equals
theprobabilityofsuccessfulpredation,multipliedbyplayeri’s incomefrom
work and raiding, net the amount i has paid in taxes. Should G choose to
12 More generally, throughout the chapter we ignore the possibility that one agent eradicates
the other. Similarly, we do not consider a situation in which one group gains military
resources by raiding the other. When this is the case, one group is likely to come to
dominate the other. This is the situation we do not consider here. Alternatively, one can
consider our analysis as related to a situation in which property rights are determined
endogenously through interactions among the economic agents. The degree to which one
can secure property rights depends upon relative coercive capabilities. See, for example,
Skaperdas (1992), Grossman (1995), and Muthoo (2000). The model also puts to one side
evolutionary forces and specialization in the use of violence (as in Moselle and Polak
2001); asymmetries among the agents (as in, for example, Grossman and Kim 1995 and
Muthoo 2000); the impact of past conﬂicts on one’s current military capabilities (Fearon
1998); uncertainty and loss of potential exchange (discussed in Skarpedas 1996) and
moral hazard issues.
By the same token, this framework enables us to extend the analysis beyond that
possible in other works. Speciﬁcally, it allows us to examine the endogenous
determination of prosperity and violence. See the papers cited above, as well as Usher
(1989) and Skaperdas (1992). The model in Muthoo (2000)i sc losest to ours. While it
explores the impact of asymmetries (which we do not), it does not enable agents to invest
in military capabilities (as we do), explore such issues as deterring raids by consuming
leisure, or examine the welfare implications of the state.Political conﬂict and state failure 265
Equilibrium path
Punishment 
phase Deviation 
Figure 7.5 The path of play
secureherincomefromtaxes,thenherincomeissimplytheamountoftaxes
paid by each private agent who has chosen to do so.
The tableau is thus peopled by a specialist in violence and two citizens,
each seeking to maximize her utility and each endowed with the capacity
to consume leisure or to secure income, if necessary, by the use of force.
The foundations of political order are captured by the conditions for an
equilibrium in which the specialist chooses to refrain from predation and
to provide security instead and in which the citizens refrain from taking up
arms and engage in leisure and productive activity instead.
To locate such an equilibrium, we cast the interaction between G and the
citizensasarepeatedgame;insuchasetting,prospectivelosseshelptodeﬁne
the equilibrium path of play (ﬁgure 7.5). The principal threats of interest
in this game are the losses that arise from state failure. When states fail,
specialistsinviolenceturntopredation;theybecomewarlords.Ratherthan
earning her income from safeguarding the possessions of others, G instead
seizesthem.Thecitizens,fortheirpart,stoppayingtaxesandre-arm,either
so as to raid or to defend themselves against raids by G or other citizens.
Because the citizens re-allocate resources from leisure and production to
military endeavors, both income and security decline.
The equilibrium of this sub-game can be called the state failure equilib-
rium. In it, there is neither security nor prosperity. It is the possibility of a
reversion to the payoffs under state failure that constitutes the threat that
promotes – or fails to promote – the decision to adhere to the choices that
yield political order (ﬁgure 7.5).
5.4 Political order as an equilibrium
To be more precise, then, the conditions for political order are:
  Each private agent chooses wi,mi,li optimally (given the strategies of
other players); refuses to raid; and pays taxes to G,i f the other agent has
not raided or if G has refrained from seizing the wealth of a private agent.266 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Payoffs 
+ 
  
0 
Time
    1     2     3      N
Payoffs on the equilibrium path 
Payoffs from defection and subsequent punishment 
Figure 7.6 Payoffs from strategy choices
Otherwise, the private agents “revolt,” refuse to pay taxes, and revert to
self-defense.
  G refrains from predating as long as neither private agent raids or fails
to pay taxes. If either agent raids or fails to pay taxes, G then becomes
predatory and seizes the wealth of the private agents.13
Under what conditions will these strategies be sustained as an
equilibrium? For a strategy to be an equilibrium strategy, no player should
be able to gain from deviating after any history, when deviation results in a
reversion to the state failure equilibrium. That is:
  No private agent should be able to gain by raiding or refusing to pay taxes
  Nor should an agent be able to gain by altering the allocation of her
resources between work, leisure, and military preparation
  G’s threat to predate must be credible
  And G must ﬁnd it optimal not to predate if the economic agents adhere
to their strategies.
In pondering these conditions, focus upon G, noting both the incentives
that prevail in equilibrium and those that arise should a deviation occur
13 Considering a similar equilibrium in which G punishes an agent who raided or failed to
pay tax without reverting to the state failure equilibrium does not change the analysis.Political conﬂict and state failure 267
(consultonceagainﬁgures7.5and7.6).BecausethecitizensandGarelocked
inagame,theirfatesareinterdependent.Thecitizens’expectationsofGand
their response to changes in her incentives also affect their willingness to
adhere to the equilibrium path of play.
G’s incentives to adhere to the equilibrium choice of strategies derive
from the revenues she can secure from taxation (ﬁgure 7.6). To induce G to
refrainfrompredation,thetaxlevel, ,needstobehighenoughthatG ﬁnds
itoptimal,giventheprivateagents’strategies,torefrainfromconﬁscatingthe
agents’wealthiftheyhavepaidtheirtaxes.Buttaxesmustalsobesufﬁciently
low that private agents prefer to purchase the services of G rather than to
incurthecostsofprovidingtheirownsecurity.Thatis,thelevelofrevenues
needs to satisfy both G’s and the citizens’ participation constraints.
Should taxes not be fully paid, G must choose between punishing and
thereby triggering a reversion to the state failure equilibrium or continuing
to play the strategies that deﬁne political order. Should public revenues
exceed the payoffs under state failure, then G would prefer to continue to
receive them rather than to punish, thus triggering state failure. The tax
level must therefore not be so high that G’s threat to predate if taxes are not
fullypaidremainscredible.Boththeneedtofulﬁllthecitizens’participation
constraintandtheneedtoﬁllG’s credibilityconstraintthusimplyanupper
bound on the level of public revenues.
As suggested by ﬁgure 7.6,h owever, conditions off the equilibrium path
also shape the incentives for G.I n particular, for G to forswear the short-
term beneﬁts of opportunism, she needs to fear the shadow cast by state
failure.
Thelowlevelsofpayoffsunderstatefailurehelptodeterpredation.Should
G be assured of high levels of income even in the midst of political disorder,
however,shemaynotfearthelossoftaxpaymentsthatwouldresultwereshe
to behave opportunistically. And should G discount the future at too high a
rate, then immediate prospects may outweigh future losses, weakening G’s
incentives to behave in a prudential manner. Should G consider her future
insecure,thenthelong-termbutmoderategainstobereapedbyactingwith
restraint would decline in value; so, too, would the long-term losses that
G would endure by way of punishment. The temptation to veer from the
equilibrium path would thus strengthen, raising the likelihood of actions
that would provoke state failure.
The discussion thus far has focused on the incentives of G.B u tnote,
too, the behavior of the private citizens. If public revenues decline, then,
understanding G’s incentives, the citizens might fear their government’s
behavior. They might expect the specialist in violence to begin to behave as
ap redator, using her power to extract resources from the private economy.
So, too,i fG’s hold on power becomes less secure: the citizens might then
fear that their government – now facing greater prospects of the loss of268 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
power – would now begin to despoil rather than to protect. And should a
majornewsourceofwealtharise–aresourceboom,say;ordiscoveriesofoil
or mineral deposits – comprehending the incentives that shape the choices
of the specialist in violence, the citizens might anticipate a change in the
conduct of their government. They might anticipate that the government
wouldforswearcostlyeffortsontheirbehalfandturninsteadtoconsuming
thebountycreatedbythebonanza.Inanticipationofthetransformationof
the specialist’s role – her change from protector to predator – the citizenry
would itself then alter its behavior: it would revert to the private provision
of security and pick up arms.
The model thus suggests three testable propositions:
1. That the likelihood of state failure should be related to the level of public
revenues.
2. Thatinsofarasgovernmentsbecomemoremyopicwhentheyfacehigher
levelsofrisk,thelikelihoodofstatefailureshouldrisewhentheirpolitical
fortunes become insecure.
3. And that governments in economies that contain valuable resources
should experience higher levels of disorder than governments in other
economies.
5.5 Qualitative support
NotethatthesepropositionsmapcloselyontokeyfeaturesofAfrica’sdevel-
opmentexperience.BecausethepropositionslimnAfricanrealities,thelogic
that generates them gains credibility.
5.5.1 Revenue
Considerpublicrevenues.Taxesontradeprovidethebulkofpublicrevenues
in Africa. When oil prices rose in the 1970s, they triggered a recession in
the global economy, resulting in a fall in the demand for Africa’s exports.
Government incomes atrophied as a result.
The late-century rise of the informal economy added to the damage
inﬂicted by the decline of exports. Where governments had imposed price
controls,productionandexchangeexitedtheformaleconomyandshiftedto
the “shadow” economy, where prices remained uncontrolled and incomes
exempt from taxation.14 Where governments had over-valued the national
currency, exports ﬂowed through “illicit” channels; when smuggled, goods
14 See the remarkable trilogy: MacGaffey (1987, 1991) and MacGaffey and
Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000).Political conﬂict and state failure 269
remained untaxed (see World Bank 1994;D ossou and Sinzogan, with
Mensah 2007;Doumbouya and Camara2007). And where crop prices were
controlled by marketing boards, the rise in prices for goods bought off the
farm posed a threat to farm incomes. In response, peasants either sold their
crops in “parallel” markets, where they could command higher prices, or
withdrewfromthemarketeconomy(Bates1981;H yden1981;deSousaand
Sulemane2007).Inbothtownandcountry,then,theresponseoftheprivate
sector to the policy choices of governments led to the contraction of the tax
base.
5.5.2 Uncertainty
Until the mid-1990s, the majority of the African governments were
authoritarian: on average, one-third of the heads of state came from the
military and three-quarters presided over no-party or single-party systems
(see chapter 10 on political reform). The late 1970s marked the peak period
of military rule; the late 1980s that of single-party systems (see chapter 10).
Then came the period of political reform. As the number of competitive
party systems rose so, too, did the percentage of states in which incumbents
were openly subject to organized political opposition. In the last decade of
thesampleperiod1970–95,multi-partypoliticalsystemsbecamethemodal
form of government in Africa. Governments that had faced no challengers
now had to compete for ofﬁce. They became less secure.
As noted by Bratton and van de Walle (1997), in 1980–5, nine of the
seventeencountriesintheirsampleheldcompetitiveelections;intheperiod
1990–4, the number rose to thirty-eight. And while before the 1990s only
one African head of state had been voted out of ofﬁce, between 1990 and
1994thenumberrosetoeleven,withthreeotherschoosingnottorun(Block
2002: 206).
5.5.3 Natural resources
Consider,too,theimpactofnaturalresources.Cilliers(2000),Hirsch(2001),
Collier and Hoefﬂer (2002), and others (Human Rights Watch 1999)s t r ess
the link between diamond deposits and the war in Angola. Reno (Reno
1998, 2000)e mphasizes the link between natural resources and civil wars
in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Johnson (2003)s tresses the role of oil in the
civil war in Sudan, and Zinn and others (Kirk-Greene 1971;S u b eru 2001;
Zinn 2005) the impact of oil on political conﬂict in Nigeria. So pervasive
is the link between resource wealth and political conﬂict that it has given
rise to a literature on the “resource curse” – a force disrupting politics, it is
claimed, in Indonesia, Russia, and the Middle East as well (Chaudry 1997;
Ross 2003).T
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The logic that underlies our analysis of political disorder thus resonates
withaccountsofpoliticsinAfrica.Theargumentisthusplausible.Itistime
to assess its validity.
6T esting the argument
6.1 Variables
According to the model, when people anticipate that incentives now favor
predation by the specialists in violence, they revert to the private provision
of security. That is, they arm themselves. We therefore take as our indicator
of state failure the formation of private militias.15 In gathering data to test
theargument,codersansweredthefollowingquestion:“Foragivencountry
in a given year: were there reports of a private military organization?”16 If
the answer was “yes,” then the dependent variable takes the value 1; if “no,”
the value 0.
Dividing the magnitude of central government’s revenue for a given year
by the magnitude of its GDP generated a measure of PUBLIC REVENUES.
Pricedataandproductionﬁgurescollectedfromcommercialsourcesyielded
the value of each country’s annual, per capita PETROLEUM production.
DataonAfrica’spoliticalsystemsindicatedforeachyearwhethertheheadof
statepresidedoveraNO-PARTY,ONE-PARTY,orMULTI-PARTYpolitical
system, thus capturing the level of political competition and suggesting the
rate of discount. Table 7.6 provides a list and description of the variables
and notes the sources from which they were taken.
Thedependentvariableisqualitative.Becauseitisboundedfromaboveby
1andfrombelowby0,theerrorsfromregressionwillnotbeidenticallydis-
tributed. I therefore employ the probit rather than the normal distribution;
when introducing ﬁxed effects, I employ the conditional logistic model.
Missing values in the data pose a major problem for the analysis. Not
only is there a great deal of it, but also there is every reason to presume
that it correlates with the likelihood of violence.17 Resorting to case-wise
deletion–thatis,todroppingobservationsthatlackdataforkeyvariables–
would decrease the efﬁciency and increase the potential for bias in the esti-
mates. It would also reduce the number of cases relative to the depth of the
panel, thereby introducing an additional source of bias (Judson and Owen
1999).
15 It is the militarization and not the violence that the model explains. For a thoughtful
treatment of the implication of rationality for conﬂict, see Fearon (1995).
16 Recall the sources in n.2.
17 This will come as no surprise to anyone who studies Africa. See Honaker (2000).Political conﬂict and state failure 273
As econd major problem arises from the impact of variables omitted
from the models; should they affect both the dependent and independent
variables,anyrelationshipbetweenthetwowouldbespurious.Endogeneity
poses yet another problem. Changes in the dependent variable (the level of
insecurity) could yield changes in the independent variable (such as public
revenues); the estimated relationship between the two would thus include a
component of reciprocal causality.
Methods developed by Rubin and others (Rubin 1996;S c hafer 1997)
provide an alternative to case-wise deletion, generating imputed estimates
of the missing values and their distributions. Given the magnitude and
nature of the problems posed by missing data, I employed no method that
couldnotbeimplementedonmultiple,imputeddatasets.Theintroduction
of ﬁxed effects provided a response to the second difﬁculty. I addressed the
third by introducing instrumental variables.
6.2 Core model
Table 7.7 presents the core model. The model contains measures of the
variableswhosevaluesaffectthepossibilityofpoliticalorder.Thedependent
variable is the likelihood that civil society will take up arms.18 Column
(1) contains estimates drawn from the pooled set of data using a probit
model; column (2) includes ﬁxed effects and employs a conditional ﬁxed-
effects logit model; column (3) also applies a probit model, but one that
employs instrumental variables to correct for the endogeneity of public
revenues.19
Estimatesfromthepooledsamplesuggestthatstateswhosegovernments
collectalargepercentageoftheirGDPasgovernmentrevenuesarelesslikely
to exhibit symptoms of state failure. When corrected for endogeneity bias
(column (3)), the quadratic term is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting an
upperboundtotherangeinwhichadditionalrevenuesdampenthetendency
ofarmedgroupstoform.Whenﬁxedeffectsareincludedintheestimations,
18 More precisely, the likelihood that there will be a report of the formation of domestic
military groups.
19 The instruments included ﬁrst- and second-period lagged values of public revenues; ﬁrst-
and second-period values of primary product exports; lagged measures of the portion of
government taxes derived from trade; and the weighted annual average growth rate of the
G7 economies. The instruments are strongly correlated with the present level of public
revenues; there is no reason to regard them as possessing a strong relationship with the
likelihood of the formation of armed groups in the present period. Nor are past levels of
public revenues likely to be correlated with the shock on the probability of the formation
of private militias. Standard tests suggest that the instruments are “strong.” For reasons
given above, the level of public revenues enters the equation in quadratic form. The value
of petroleum production enters in quadratic form as well, not for theoretical reasons but
because that speciﬁcation yields more precise and robust estimates.274 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 7.7 The core model.
Variable
Pooled sample
(probit estimates)
(1)
Conditional logits
(ﬁxed effects)
(2)
Instrumentalvariables
(probit estimates)
(3)
REVENUES  0.055  0.055  0.151
(0.025)   (0.063) (0.069)   
REVENUES 0.001 0.001 0.002
SQUARED (0.00) (0.001) (0.00)   
NO-PARTY  0.407  1.110  0.539
(0.214)  (0.430)    (0.12)   
ONE-PARTY  0.691  2.240  0.610
(0.258)    (0.470)    (0.09)   
DURATION
. . . No-Party 0.07 0.024 0.074
(0.021)    (0.037) (0.00)   
...One-Party 0.045 0.171 0.038
(0.016)    (0.037)    (0.00)   
. . . Multi-Party 0.001 0.077 0.006
(0.025) (0.065) (0.00)   
PETROLEUM 0.190 0.293 0.295
(0.269) (0.441) (0.02)   
PETROLEUM  0.031  0.047  0.041
SQUARED (0.037) (0.059) (0.00)   
TIME SINCE  0.087  0.019  0.082
LAST REPORT (0.017)    (0.024) (0.00)   
Constant 0.429 – 1.529
(0.340) – (6.550)
No.o bservations 1084 847 1084
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Signiﬁcance levels:    0.01;   0.05;  0.1.
the coefﬁcients become insigniﬁcant, however. One reason may be that the
variables are “slow-moving” and thus may not generate much variation in
differenced form.
Each of the three statistical models indicates that states governed by no-
party and one-party systems are signiﬁcantly less likely to yield reports of
the formation of armed groups. In this instance, it is the ﬁxed effects esti-
mates that yield the most relevant insights. Because of differencing, the
coefﬁcients can be interpreted as indicating the impact on political order ofPolitical conﬂict and state failure 275
ac hange from a no- or single-party to a multi-party system. Note that the
coefﬁcients of the party system variables are larger than those derived from
the pooled sample. The results suggest that a change to competitive poli-
tics is signiﬁcantly associated with an increase in the likelihood of political
disorder.20
Basingestimatesuponthecoefﬁcientsoftheinstrumentalvariablemodel
(results not shown here) indicates that the largest (marginal) effects arise
frompetroleumproductionandthepartysystem.When,onaverage,theper
capita value of petroleum production reaches $100, then the likelihood of
theformationofprivatemilitiasrisesbynearly3percentagepoints.Achange
from a no-party to a competitive party system increases the likelihood by 5
percentage points; a change from a one-party to a competitive party system
increases it by 6.
Table7.8addsacollectionofcontrolvariablestothemodel.Theseinclude
measuresofmodernization:INCOME,LITERACY,andURBANPOPULA-
TION,plusacompositeMODERNIZATIONscore(seetable7.6fordetails).
Thecontrolsalsoincludemeasuresofshocks.Twoareeconomic:short-term
changesinGROWTHandDROUGHT.21 Athirdispoliticalandrecordsthe
incidenceofanationalELECTION.Others(e.g.Sambanis2001;Fearonand
Laitin 2003;s ee also Herbst2000)s tress the importance of state size, noting
that large states are more costly to police. To control for size, I include a
measure of POPULATION.
Political disorder in one country affects the likelihood of disorder in its
neighbors(MurdochandSandler2002);andthepresenceofmilitarygroups
in one year can increase the likelihood of their presence in the next. The
variableNEIGHBORprovidesameasureofthenumberofdomesticmilitary
groups, civil wars, and international conﬂicts in neighboring countries and
another, CROSS-BORDER, records the percentage of the state’s population
thatbelongtogroupswhosemembershipspillsacrossnationalboundaries.
Asdataforthelasthavebeengatheredforonlyoneperiod(seeMorrisonetal.
1989; Englebert 2000; Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002), the measure is
time-invariant; it is therefore interacted with NEIGHBOR when entered in
the ﬁxed-effect equations. A measure of the TIME SINCE LAST REPORT
helps to correct for the interdependence between the annual observations.
20 The introduction of period effects does not alter this ﬁnding.
21 Unlike Miguel, Shanker, and Sergenti (2004), I include both DROUGHT and GROWTH
in all equations. During periods of drought, pastoralists seeking grazing land alter their
migration routes and therefore pose a threat to the land rights of others. Because drought
thus affects the likelihood of disorder through its impact on land rights as well as on
growth, it is not a valid instrument for growth. I therefore include it among the control
variables.T
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Inthisinstance,theinstrumentalvariablesseektocorrectfortheendogene-
ity of GROWTH as well as REVENUES.
With one signiﬁcant exception, the coefﬁcients of the theoretical vari-
ables behave in the equations that include the control variables in the same
manner, by and large, as they do in the equations of the core model. The
exception is REVENUES, where the coefﬁcient becomes much larger in
the equations that incorporate instruments when the additional variables
are entered into the equation.22
The coefﬁcients linking the modernization variables to political disorder
are insigniﬁcant in estimates drawn from the pooled sample. Those drawn
from the ﬁxed-effects equations suggest that increases in LITERACY and
URBAN POPULATION can lead to increases in the likelihood of political
disorder.
The estimates from the pooled equation suggest that GROWTH shocks
and DROUGHT also affect the likelihood of disorder. Higher levels of
GROWTH reduce the likelihood of domestic militarization; DROUGHT
increases it.23 The estimates for GROWTH are not robust, however. When
ﬁxed effects or instrumental variables are introduced, the coefﬁcient for
GROWTH reverses in sign and it become insigniﬁcant in the ﬁxed-
effects models. Those for DROUGHT retain a positive sign, although
they, too, lose signiﬁcance when ﬁxed effects are incorporated into the
models.
More robust is the coefﬁcient on the measure of political shocks, ELEC-
TIONS. It is has been argued that elections are politically destabilizing.24
Our estimates offer little support for that argument: in each speciﬁcation,
the evidence indicates that there were fewer reports of militarized groups
in the year before elections. One possibility is that political organizations
alter the means by which they compete for power, changing from the use
of violence to the search for votes. Another is that governments simply may
not hold elections during periods of great insecurity and that the estimate
is therefore biased.
As suggested by Herbst (2000) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), the coefﬁ-
cientsonPOPULATIONsuggestthatlargercountriesmaybemoredifﬁcult
to pacify. But differences in size do not bear a signiﬁcant relationship to the
likelihood of disorder in most speciﬁcations.
The coefﬁcients on NEIGHBOR and CROSS-BORDER are of the
expected sign and are signiﬁcant in most equations.
22 Again, tests indicate that the instruments are not “weak.”
23 The measure is the number of hectares of land per capita.D ecreases in the measure
therefore indicate increases in drought, and a negative sign on the coefﬁcient suggests a
positive relationship between drought and disorder.
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Turningtotheestimatesofthemarginaleffectsofthevariables,employing
thecoefﬁcientsgeneratedwhenusinginstrumentalvariables,theresults(not
shown here) again conﬁrm the importance of petroleum and the party sys-
tem among the theoretical variables. The magnitude of their effect remains
virtually unaltered when control variables are entered into the equations.
Among the latter set of variables, it is income that emerges as the strongest
correlate of disorder. The estimates suggest that moving 1 standard devia-
tionabovethemeaninpercapitaincomewouldreducethelikelihoodofthe
formation of militias by 7 percentage points.
6.3 Discussion
TheliteratureonpoliticalconﬂictinAfricastressesitseconomicorigins.The
resultsabovesuggesttheneedforgreaternuance.Whilesocietieswithlower
incomes are more prone to political disorder, the evidence underscores the
importance of political factors. While the literature emphasizes the role of
GDP, this analysis emphasizes the role of public revenues: poorer states,i t
argues, are more likely to experience state failure. And while these accounts
stress the role of economic factors, this points to the central importance of
the party system.
Other literatures do emphasize political rather than economic sources of
conﬂict. One variant focuses on the destabilizing role of democratization,
stressing in particular the role of competitive elections (Zakaria 1997;S n y -
der 2000). The ﬁndings reported here call once again for a more nuanced
interpretation.Whilecompetitivepoliticalsystemsaremorelikelytogener-
ate reports of private military groups than are no- or single-party systems,
thereisnoevidencethatelectionsthemselvesprovoketheformationofpri-
vate militias. The link between political reform and political disorder runs,
theevidencesuggests,notthroughelectoralcompetitionbutratherthrough
the fear of, and reaction to, the prospects of losing ofﬁce.
The ﬁndings suggest that when states are starved or sated with revenues;
when the incumbents in regimes hitherto immune to open political
opposition must face organized political challengers; and when those in
power have access to resource rents, then elites and citizens behave in ways
that lead to state failure.
7I n search of causal paths
Inclosing,wereturntothequalitativeliteratureinsearchofthelinksbetween
resource rents, political competition, and government revenues on the one
hand, and state failure, on the other.280 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
7.1 Petroleum production
Regional conﬂict provides one link, be it between center and periphery or
betweenthoseregionsthatlackandthosethatareblessedwithanabundance
of natural resources.
Among the issues that motivated the people of eastern Nigeria to take up
arms against the central government in 1967 was their demand for control
over petroleum deposits in the region. In key meetings between the leaders
oftheEasternRegionandtheCentralGovernment,ColonelChukwuemeka
Ojukukwi indicated that the Eastern Region would remain within Nigeria
werethenationstructuredasaconfederation–oneinwhichtheEastwould
secure control over petroleum resources. The Central Government refused
to accede to this proposal, however, largely (in the words of Khan 1994: 10)
because of “the issue of oil revenue distribution.”
With the breakdown of negotiations came the outbreak of the war. The
Central Government’s primary military objective (Dudley 1982: 113) was
to seize the oil ﬁelds. The commander of the forces that secured that objec-
tive, Olesegun Obasanjo, still ﬁghts for control over Nigeria’s petroleum
deposits: now President of Nigeria, he has again moved troops to the oil-
producingregions,seekingtorepressrebelswho,fortheirpart,seektocheck
his attempts to seize the resources of their region on behalf of the central
government (NewY ork Times September 30, 2004: A11).
A similar narrative characterizes the Sudan. The central government and
SouthernRegionhadlongstruggledoverissuesascommonplaceaspolitical
preferment and as volatile as race and religion. Shortly after independence,
am utiny of southern units of the armed forces led to the outbreak of war;
yearsofﬁghtingandsubsequentcompromisesledtoitstermination.In1978
came reports of the discovery of oil deposits in the northern reaches of the
southern region. The national assembly then altered the regional bound-
aries,separatingtheoilﬁeldsfromthesouthandlocatingtheminthenorth,
thereby placing them under de facto control of the central government. In
combination with the political marginalization of Southern leaders and the
impositionofSharialawinthenorth,wheremanysouthernerslived,theloss
ofoilrevenuesledtotheresumptionofcivilwar(Mitchell1993;W oodward
1995; de Waal 1997;A li and Matthews 1999;J ohnson 2003).
These narratives suggest that forces at the center mobilize their political
and military might to capture the streams of income that emanate from
Africa’s natural resources, while those who dwell in the richly endowed
regionseektocapturethatincomeforthemselves.Bothbackuptheirclaims
with military force, thereby establishing a link between resource endow-
ments and political conﬂict.
Qualitative accounts suggest an additional tie between resource wealth
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the wealth generated by natural endowments, the government no longer
strives to provide services for its citizens. Recoded in terms of our analysis,
thepoliticalcontractbetweenGandthecitizensappearsthentobreakdown:
the specialist in violence no longer needs to exchange services, such as the
protection of property rights, for the receipt of public revenues.
To illustrate, Amos Sawyer – once an opponent of the government of
William Tolbert and later himself Liberia’s President – points to the growth
ofgovernmentrevenuesfromnaturalresourcesanditsimpactonthegovern-
ment’s behavior: “iron ore royalties and other forms of business, especially
multinational corporations, relieved the government from reliance on hut
taxes,” he writes, and “the government thus gained sources of income inde-
pendent of the performance of its...a dministrative apparatus” (Sawyer
1992: 10). The result, in Sawyer’s words, was the “emergence of autocracy”:
ap residency that ruled the country as a “personal domain” (1992: 10).
Cilliers (2000) notes a similar pattern in Angola, where the revenue-sated
politicaleliteshaveretiredtothepresidentialmansion,leavingittothepeo-
ple themselves to provide their own health care, sanitation, housing, and
security.
Returning to Nigeria, we can also turn to the comments of Billy Dudley
(Dudley1982):“theoilboom,”hewrites,“wasadisaster”–onemadeworse
by military rule. As Dudley states:
Under military rule, with no constituents to conciliate and no electorate to be
accountableto–inhoweverweakasenseoneinterpretsthenotionofaccountability–
the effect of the oil boom was to convert the military political decision makers into
anewproperty-owning,rentierclassworkingincloseanddirectcollaborationwith
foreign business interests with the sole aim of expropriating the surpluses derived
from oil for their own private beneﬁt. (Dudley 1982: 116)
Qualitative materials thus suggest possible links between petroleum pro-
duction and political order. One runs through the politics of income distri-
bution,notbetweenrichindividualsandpoorbutratherbetweenthecenter
and the periphery or between regions endowed with natural resources and
those that are not.25 As econd runs through the incentives that shape the
behavior of elites. Sated with resource wealth, those who govern no longer
have an incentive to safeguard the welfare of their people in exchange for
public revenues. Instead they abandon the strategies that, in equilibrium,
support political order.
25 While a new theme in this chapter, the impact of regional tensions is addressed in greater
depth inc hapter 6 by Azam and it is one to which we shall shortly return (see below).282 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
7.2 Revenues
Specialistsinviolencecantransmuteforceintosecurity;buttheyneedtobe
paidtodoso.Iftheﬂowofearningsfromtheprovisionofthisserviceisworth
less than the immediate beneﬁts from predation (less the subsequent losses
from state failure), then they will instead use force to engage in predation,
rendering the citizenry less secure and more likely to pick up arms. This
is one strand of the logic advanced in this chapter, and the estimates lend
support to the argument.
Theevidencefromtheliteraturesuggeststhattherelationshiprunsalong
several different paths. One is through the non-payment of the military.
Rather than paying their salaries, some governments instead accumulate
arrears. This form of non-payment characterizes the francophone states,
which are unable to monetize their debts. Decalo discusses the example of
Benin (Decalo 1997: 11); O’Toole (1997) the case of the CAR; Yates (1996)
the case of Gabon; and Mundt (1997), Huband (1998), and Hills (2000),
the example of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. In each instance, non-payment resulted in
riots and looting by soldiers. Outside of the franc zone, non-payment takes
a different form: the erosion of the real value of the soldiers’ pay. Where
central banks are able to lend to governments so that they can pay their
debts,thengovernmentscanrenegeonthosedebtsbyincreasingthesupply–
and thus lowering the value – of their currencies. Perhaps the best example
comes from Zaire.26 When in 1993 Mobutu tried – once again – to pay his
debts by issuing bank notes, his soldiers at last refused to accept them. They
rebelled, refused payment, and turned to looting.
Whenleftunpaidbytheirgovernments,specialistsinviolenceseektopay
themselves. One way is through extortion. As stated by Kasozi (1994), in
Uganda in the 1980s,
Any soldier who needed money . . . would just pick an isolated . . . part of the road,
put logs or chains across it, and wait for unfortunate travelers. These twentieth
century highwaymen would rob anyone of anything they fancied: cash, watches,
cassette radios, clothes, and the like. (1994: 164)
GeneralKpamaBaramoto,commanderoftheCivilGuardinZaire,levied
at oll on mineral and diamond production in Eastern Zaire, issued trad-
ing licenses, and, for turning a blind eye, took payments from smugglers
(MacGaffey 1987: 60–2; Pech 2000). Or, as in Liberia, soldiers can turn into
“sobels”–soldiersbyday,rebelsbynight–thusenjoyingthenon-monetary
perquisitesofpublicemployment,suchashousing,andtheﬁnancialrewards
of rebellion: ransoms, loot, and plunder (Howe 2000: 57; see also Ellis
1999).
26 Among the numerous accounts, see Nzongola-Ntanlaja (2002).Political conﬂict and state failure 283
Soldiers possess another option, of course, and that is themselves to seize
power. Illustrative are the memoirs of one James Waore Dianga, a junior
ofﬁcerwhoinAugust1982attemptedtooverthrowthegovernmentofDaniel
ArapMoi,presidentofKenya.Diangaandhiscolleagueswitnessedadecline
in the ability or inclination of the government to provide equipment that
worked, uniforms that ﬁtted, housing that was adequate, food that was
palatable,orpaythatwouldenablethesoldierstoliveinreasonablecomfort.
As stated by Dianga: “A soldier . . . signs a contract with the State . . . The
soldier,onhis/herpart,isunderoathtodefendtheState...Thegovernment
enters intoa na g r e e m e n t...t os u p p l yt h esoldier” (Dianga 2002: 48–9).
The declining fortunes of the soldiers broke the letter of the contract, and
the rising fortune of the President’s cronies violated its spirit; in response,
Dianga writes, the soldiers rebelled.
The attempted coup led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in Ghana in
1979 offers another example. Under-paid and without decent clothing or
adequate shelter, the rank and ﬁle seethed in resentment as their ofﬁcers –
themselves now in charge of the state – enriched themselves while aban-
doning to their fate those whom they commanded. Rawlings’ denunciation
of Ghana’s elite and of their violation of the contract between the soldier
and the state occupies a prominent place in Ghana’s – indeed, in Africa’s –
political heritage.27
Regionalism provides a second link. In Africa, as elsewhere, the desire
for redistribution motivates politics. Regions that are relatively poor seek
to extract revenues from those that are rich. Such efforts need not lead to
conﬂict, however: with sufﬁcient public revenues, elites from richer regions
canretaintheloyaltyofthosefromthelessprosperousregionsbychanneling
beneﬁts to them, thus forestalling armed challenges (Azam 1994).
Evidence comes from Cˆ ote d’Ivoire, where political order rested on a
series of pacts negotiated between regional elites and the center (see Boone
2003 and Azam 1994). Southerners, and in particular the Akan, controlled
the center. Prominent in the periphery were the Senoufo, who possessed a
well-organized polity in the north. “The complaint of the north,” Boone
writes, was that “their region was impoverished and relegated to backward
political status” (2003: 263). To counter mounting discontent, President
Houphou¨ et-Boignylaunched“amassiveinfusionofresources”(2003:263),
startingprojectsthatledtotheopeningofparastatalagencies,theconstruc-
tion of roads, and the founding of cotton and livestock industries in the
region. Channeling an intensive ﬂow of beneﬁts in the area dominated by
27 Ironically, the statement emanates from the prosecution’s depiction of the motives for the
coup, rather then from the mouth of Rawlings himself. See the account in Shillington
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theSenoufo,thegovernmentrecruitedmembersoftherulingclansintothe
agencies that managed these projects (Boone 2003: 267ff.).
This tactic is, of course, risky: should revenues fall, then the government
may be unable to fulﬁll the key periphery’s participation constraint. With
the end of the coffee boom of the late 1970s, those in the center could no
longer credibly pledge to target the north with projects (Rapley 1993). The
north therefore began to organize against the central government. After the
deathofHouphou¨ et-Boigny,theforcesofthenorthgatheredaboutAllasane
Outtara: once Prime Minister, he now sought to become President. Led by
Laurent Gbagbo, southern politicians rallied to check the rise of Outtara,
portrayinghimasanon-nationalandthereforeineligibleforhighofﬁce.The
courtsagreed.Followingacoupbysoldierswhomthegovernmenthadfailed
to pay, the rival politicians transformed their political organizations from
political parties into armed militias and plunged Cˆ ote d’Ivoire into war.28
As econd source of risk arises from the inconsistency of preferences
and resultant inability to commit. In order to secure the demobilization
of the periphery, the government may pledge to transfer resources. Once
the periphery surrenders, however, the government may prefer to renege
on its pledges. Knowing that, the periphery may therefore ignore the gov-
ernment’s promises and refuse to demobilize. As stressed by Fearon (1998),
AcemogluandRobinson(2001),AzamandMesnard(2003),andothers,for
co-optation to work, promises must be credible.29
Incompilingdataforthesampleofforty-sixAfricancountriesover1970–
95, I noted whether countries were marked by regional inequalities and
whether the Chief Executive came from an economically privileged or a
poorlyendowedregion.Asseenintable7.9,whentheChiefExecutivecame
fromalessprosperousregion,thelikelihoodofmassmilitarizationdeclined.
The marginal effects (not shown here) are large, suggesting that having
aP resident from a non-prosperous region reduces the likelihood of milita-
rization by 19 percentage points. The evidence thus suggests that insofar as
regionaldifferencesmatter,pledgesoftransferstendtobeincredible.Defus-
ing the political tensions that arise between rich regions and poor appears
to require that the elite from the poorer region secure the power to allocate
the state’s resources.
28 The split between the north and south was not the sole line of cleavage, it should be
stressed. Particularly within the south, major animosities set the western regions against
those of the east.
29 This arguments draws on the logic of the “security dilemma” that pervades multi-ethnic
societies. See Posen (1993) and Fearon (1998). It also echoes the arguments advanced by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) as they strive to
identify when political order will give way to conﬂict or persist because of reform. It
parallels most closely, however, the analysis of Azam and Mesnard (2003), who strive to
explain the disintegration of Cˆ ote d’Ivoire.Political conﬂict and state failure 285
Table 7.9 President from non-prosperous region.
Variable Pooled sample
(probit estimates)
Conditional logits
(ﬁxed effects)
Instrumentalvariables
(probit estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
REVENUES  0.053  0.051  0.159
(0.03)  (0.07) (0.04)   
REVENUES SQUARED 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
PRESIDENT FROM NON-  0.362  0.727  0.476
PROSPEROUS REGION (0.17)   (0.35)  (0.08)   
NO-PARTY  0.588  0.669  0.545
(0.26)   (0.51) (0.29) 
ONE-PARTY  0.728  1.812  0.822
(0.28)    (0.58)    (0.33)  
DURATION
. . . No-Party 0.073 0.008 0.069
(0.02)    (0.04) (0.00)   
...One-Party 0.046 0.141 0.056
(0.02)   (0.05)    (0.00)   
. . . Multi-Party 0.001 0.012  0.007
(0.02) (0.07) (0.00)
PETROLEUM 0.227 1.404 0.244
(0.33) (1.18) (0.03)   
PETROLEUM SQUARED  0.029  0.161  0.031
(0.04) (0.14) (0.00)   
MODERNIZATION  0.128 1.122  0.044
(0.18) (0.80) (0.06)
GROWTH  0.019  0.025 0.127
(0.01)    (0.02) (0.16)
DROUGHT  0.430  0.855  0.540
(0.19)   (0.95) (0.48)
ELECTIONS  0.305  0.607  0.283
(0.16)  (0.31)  (0.10)   
POPULATION 0.105 1.384 0.071
(0.09) (1.35) (0.05)
NEIGHBORS 0.160 – 0.189
(0.079)   – (0.041)   
CROSS-BORDER  0.216 –  0.202
(0.121)  – (0.190)
NEIGHBOR*CROSS- –  0.026 –
BORDER – (0.019) –
TIME SINCE LAST  0.080  0.005  0.047
REPORT (0.02)    (0.03) (1.190)
Constant  0.971 – 0.851
(1.552) – (20.701)
No.o bservations 1048 813 1048
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Signiﬁcance levels:    0.01;   0.05;  0.1.286 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
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Figure 7.7 Rate of loss of ofﬁce, by period, 1970–1994
7.3 Political reform
To probe the link between political reform and state failure, consider the
level of risk faced by incumbent regimes. We have information concerning
the departure from ofﬁce of eighty-eight leaders over the period 1970–95.
The number of incumbents rose from thirty-six at the beginning of the
period to forty-six at the end. Figure 7.7 portrays the rate at which they lost
ofﬁce in each period; ﬁgure 7.8 the manner of their exit.
Viewed one way, the data suggest that African leaders faced less risk after
the period of reform than they did in earlier periods. As seen in ﬁgure 7.7,
in the period 1975–9, 53.5 percent of the leaders lost ofﬁce as opposed to
48.8 percent in 1990–4. And as seen in ﬁgure 7.8,f o l lowing the onset of
political reform in 1989, the relative frequency of peaceful exits – resulting
from resignations, electoral losses, or natural deaths – for the ﬁrst time
exceeded that of violent departures – resulting from coups, assassinations,
orforcefulexpulsionfromofﬁce.Datanotpresentedhereindicatethatover
80 percent of the violent departures took place in no-party states – i.e. in
states often ruled by the military. Over 60 percent of the peaceful exits took
place in competitive party systems. These data give reason, then, to argue
that political reform led to a less risky political environment.
Viewedanotherway,however,thedatasupportanalternativevision.The
risks to incumbents of coming to a violent end may have declined in thePolitical conﬂict and state failure 287
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sample period (ﬁgure 7.8). But the risk of loss of ofﬁce rose (ﬁgure 7.7),
returning to the level it had been in the late 1970s – the least stable period
in post-independence Africa. Consider, moreover, the period just prior to
reform: over the previous decade, the prospects of losing ofﬁce had been
decliningandpoliticalleadersappearedtohavegainedanincreasinglysecure
hold on power. As seen in ﬁgure 7.7,h owever, with 1989 came a rise in the
levelofpoliticalinsecurity:theriskoflossofofﬁcerosesharply.Indicativeof
theleaders’ownassessment,perhaps,isthat70percentofthetotalvoluntary
exits from the post of Chief Executive took place in the period 1985–94 –
40 percent in 1985–9 and 30 percent in 1990–4 – suggesting a downward
revision in the leaders’ assessment of their political prospects.
Some of Africa’s leaders may have stepped down in the face of the threat
posed by political reform; others fought back. Consider, for example, the
caseofKenyainthe1990s.DanielArapMoi,theincumbent,camefromthe
Rift Valley. The Valley contained forty-four of the 188 parliamentary con-
stituencies. As the President could ﬁll twelve other seats with nominees of
his own, if he could consolidate his political base he would then be assured
close to 30 percent of the parliamentary seats even before the outset of the
campaign. But ethnic groups from other regions had migrated into the Rift
Valleyinsearchofland;andtheytendedtovoteforthepoliticalpartiesthat
they had supported in their place of origin, which in key instances stood in288 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
opposition to the ruling party. The President and his backers, Kimenyi and
Ndung’u (2005)c laim, therefore launched a program of political intim-
idation.30 Organizing private militias, they invaded settler communities,
beat and killed their residents, drove off their livestock, and burnt down
shops,schools,andhomes.Fearingthelossofpower,theincumbentturned
predatory and used force to violate rather than to safeguard the security of
citizens. As Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005)c onclude, “the main motivation
behind the violence was to inﬂuence voting in favor of the [ruling party]”
(2005: 326).
Consider,too,thecaseofSierraLeone.Mostaccountsofpoliticalconﬂict
inSierraLeonebeginwiththe1991invasionoftheRUF.Butotheraccounts,
especiallythosewrittenbyscholarsfromSierraLeone,startearlier,focusing
on the conduct of the APC, the ruling party.
In the 1970s, the APC faced challenges from its traditional rival, the
SLPP, and from dissidents disillusioned by the decline in Sierra Leone’s
economy under the APC.31 The APC responded violently to these threats
to its power. In a manner that foreshadowed later events in Rwanda and
Zimbabwe, the governing party mobilized the party’s youth league and the
government’s police to break up the rallies of the opposition parties; to
beat up its sympathizers; and to intimidate those in the media that might
sympathize with their cause. Fearing the loss of power, the ruling party
turnedviolent.Asstatedbyaprominentmemberoftheopposition,theAPC
had no support in the East. So how were they going to win? They knew they would
wini n the North and Western areas, but not in the East. Parliament would then
be balanced between the two parties. They wanted to win, so there was violence.32
(Quoted in Hayward and Kandeh 1987: 50)
When civil war later broke out in Sierra Leone, a major goal of the
combatants was to rid themselves of a political elite that was willing to
attack its own people in order to retain political ofﬁce.
It was when the political elite faced the prospect of losing ofﬁce that
governments turned predatory. Table 7.10 notes the dates when “national
conferences”wereconvened.Attheseconferences,citizensjoinedpoliticians
in debating the performance and structure of their governments. Several
conferences assumed sovereign powers; virtually all reintroduced multi-
party systems. In the face of such challenges, governments began to attack
their citizens. Consider ﬁgure 7.9, for example, which presents the mean
Freedom House Ratings for all countries which were independent by 1988.
On the surface, it portrays Africa’s widely celebrated move to democracy.
30 Forc onﬁrmation of this account, see also Kenya (1992); Human Rights Watch/Africa
(1993); Hempstone (1997).
31 Which started in 1968.
32 See also Barrows (1976); Abdullah (2004); Kandeh (2004).Political conﬂict and state failure 289
Table 7.10 National conferences.
Election Outcome: Incumbent
Country Date Duration Month F&F? Ousted Retained
Benin Feb. 1990 1 week Feb. 1991 yes  
Mar. 1996 yes  
Congo Feb. 1991 3 months Aug. 1992 yes  
Gabon Mar. 1990 3 weeks Dec. 1993 no  
Mali Jul. 1991 2 weeks Apr. 1992 yes  
Niger Jul. 1991 6 weeks Feb. 1993 yes  
Burkina Faso Aug. 1991 2 months Dec. 1991 no  
Ghana Aug. 1991 7 months Dec. 1992 yes  
Togo Aug. 1991 1 month Aug. 1993 no  
Zaire Aug. 1991 1 year – –
CAR Oct. 1991 2 months Aug. 1992 yes  
Chad Jan. 1993 3 months Jun. 1996 no  
Note: F&F refers to whether international observers ruled the election “free and fair.”
Source: Zartman (1997): 41.
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Butthentakeadeeperlookandremovefromthesample“sharpimprovers,”
countries whose scores improved by more than 2 points between 1988 and
1994. These were S˜ ao Tom´ e and Principe ( 5), Benin, Cape Verde, and
Malawi( 4),andGuinea-BissauandSouthAfrica( 3).Settingtheseaside,
we can see higher (and therefore worse) average scores for the remaining
forty countries, suggesting their relative failure to reform and, more rele-
vantly, an upward spike in their scores in the early 1990s. Lying below such
ﬁgures are such incidents as the Saba Saba killings in Kenya, when govern-
mentforcesshotdowntwenty-eightpeopleatarallycalledbyanopposition
party; the drowning of protestors in the B´ e Lagoon of Lom´ ei n 1991 and
the slaughter of protestors by soldiers in 1993, which resulted in the ﬂeeing
of Togo by thousands of refugees (Heilbrunn 1993); the 1993 massacres of
therulingarmedforcesinBurundi;andgenocidesinKasai,orchestratedby
Mobutu to disrupt the political opposition (Huband 2001;s ee also Monga
1996 and Hempstone 1997). Just as political reform became more likely, so,
too, did many governments become more willing to violate the rights of
their citizens.
Recall the ﬁndings above: most elections do not result in the taking up
of arms; they appear to induce demobilization. What appears to trigger
the militarization of political life is the prospect of the loss of power. When
incumbentssensethattheywillloseinopencompetitionforofﬁce,theythen
mobilize the power of the state to vanquish their opponents. As phrased
by Keen, there is an “elite backlash” (Keen 2000: 24). And civic society,
feeling insecure, becomes more likely to organize in defense of their lives
and property.
8C onclusion
This chapter has probed the roots of political disorder and state collapse.
Analyzingtheconditionsunderwhichgovernmentswoulduseforcetopro-
tect rather than to predate and people would delegate the use of coercion
to those who govern, this chapter has addressed the causes of state break-
down in contemporary Africa. Africa shows that the Weberian state is not
ag iven. It results when these choices form an equilibrium. The poverty of
thestate,theprospectsofwealthfrom predation,andtheprospectoflosing
ofﬁce form the conditions under which this equilibrium will collapse and
governments trigger the rise of political disorder.
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